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Abstract
We run an experiment in which two subjects play a two-round minimum eﬀort game in
the presence of a third player (principal) who is the only one informed about past eﬀort
choices and beneﬁts from a higher minimum eﬀort of the others. Sanctions introduced in the
second round by the experimenter lead to more optimistic beliefs and higher eﬀorts. This is
not true when sanctions have been imposed by the principal. The possibility that the choice
of a sanction is a signal of low eﬀort levels causes players who chose high eﬀort in the ﬁrst
round to be less optimistic.
Keywords: Sanctions, beliefs, expressive law, deterrence, coordination, minimum eﬀort
game.
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1 Introduction
In the standard economic view, sanctions are eﬀective because they change economic payoﬀs
and modify individuals’ incentives to engage in certain actions. More recently, the results from
several experiments suggest that the eﬀect of sanctions is not always so straightforward, and
that sanctions can even be counterproductive in some situations (see Frey and Jegen (2001) and
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1Bowles (2008) for overviews). Existing explanations of this eﬀect usually rely on the psychologi-
cal concept of ‘intrinsic motivation’, a motivation to act virtuously that can be ‘crowded out’by
sanctions. In this paper we suggest another way in which sanctions can have adverse eﬀect. It
is relevant in environments where the authority with the ability to introduce sanctions is more
informed than those that can be sanctioned. In particular we consider the following research
questions related to the positive and negative eﬀects of sanctions:
1. Can the incentives associated with non-deterrent sanctions induce desired behavior and
make agents more optimistic about other players’ actions?
2. In situations of imperfect information about the past behavior of other group members,
can the introduction of sanctions make agents more pessimistic about the actions of others
by giving a signal that other players do not behave well? If so, does this reduce the
eﬀectiveness of sanctions?
We investigate these questions in an experiment based on the minimum eﬀort game. The
minimum eﬀort game is a coordination game with many Pareto ranked equilibria. Each player
chooses a level of costly eﬀort, and is rewarded according the minimum of the eﬀorts of all
players in the group. The more eﬃcient equilibria result only if all players play individually
risky strategies. Doubt about the other player’s willingness to play such a strategy may result
in ineﬃcient outcomes. Thus, the game is particularly suitable as a workhorse to answer our
questions, because there are multiple equilibria and players’ eﬀorts are strategic complements.
Consider Question 1. Sanctions have a direct eﬀect by providing incentives to choose higher
eﬀort. They also have an indirect or forward looking belief eﬀect due to eﬀorts being strategic
complements. Anticipating that opponents are similarly aﬀected by the sanctions and thus are
expected to choose higher eﬀorts reinforces one’s own incentive to choose a higher eﬀort.
Question 2 addresses the signaling or backward looking belief eﬀect of sanctions. When past
behavior is not directly observable, sanctions may carry a signal that things are not going so well.
After all, why introduce a sanction to suppress socially undesirable behavior when everybody
behaves saintly? In other words, sanctions may be perceived as ‘apparently necessary’. Thus,
the signaling eﬀect of introducing sanctions may reduce the willingness to play a high and risky
level of eﬀort, and decreases the eﬀectiveness of sanctions.
This way of looking at sanctions relates closely to an established tradition in legal scholarship.
Economists and legal scholars have explored ways in which sanctions can be eﬀective by aﬀecting
peoples’ preferences and values (Sunstein 1996, Kahan 1997, Fehr and Falk, 2002). In this role,
rules and sanctions express a normative judgement of desirable behavior. Sanctions can also aid
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behavior of others (Cooter, 1998, McAdams 2000). This expressive dimension of sanctions can
inﬂuence people’s behavior independently of material incentives associated with enforcement.
To answer the questions above we describe the results of a laboratory experiment, in which
we focus on the eﬀects of mild, non-deterrent sanctions in a coordination game. In particular, we
look at the diﬀerences between the eﬀects of ‘exogenous sanctions’, and the eﬀects of ‘endogenous
sanctions’ (deﬁned below). Our workhorse game is the minimum eﬀort coordination game with
many Pareto-ranked equilibria as introduced by Goeree and Holt (2001, 2005). In all treatments
agents were matched in groups of three, where the third player was a “principal” who beneﬁtted
proportionally to the minimum eﬀort chosen by the other two in the group. The subjects played
the minimum eﬀort game twice, but the third player was the only one to be informed of the
outcome of the ﬁrst round before the second round was played. This information structure
was common knowledge. Before the second round of the minimum eﬀort game was played, the
principal could decide whether to introduce a sanction F to both players in the group, that
lowered the earnings of subject if she selected low eﬀort. The sanction F came at a small cost to
the principal’s own earnings. We call this the endogenous sanction, because it was introduced
by a third party in a reaction to the behavior of the subjects. The sanction was ‘mild’ in the
sense that it made playing low eﬀort a more costly, but not a dominated strategy. In another
treatment, the same sanction F was introduced automatically. We call this the exogenous
sanction, because it was introduced by the experimenter unconditional on past eﬀort choices by
the subjects. Across these treatments we compare the eﬀect of sanctions on eﬀort choices and
reported beliefs about what the other player will do.
Our results show that exogenously introduced sanctions increase beliefs about the eﬀort that
the other player will play. As a result they eﬀectively increase coordination on more eﬃcient
equilibria. However, our answer to the second question reveals a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
endogenously and exogenously introduced sanctions. In our analysis of the data we distinguish
players on the basis of their behavior in the ﬁrst round. The signaling hypothesis leads us to
expect that people who played high eﬀort in the ﬁrst round and are confronted with a sanction,
will infer that the eﬀort of the other person must have been low. By contrast, someone who was
pessimistic and played low eﬀort will not be able to make such an inference, because she also
played low, and thus a sanction may have been introduced as a reaction to her own behavior.
We thus expect a diﬀerence between the eﬀects of endogenous and exogenous sanctions for high
eﬀort players, but not for low eﬀort players. In accordance with this hypothesis, we ﬁnd that
there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the eﬀectiveness of the two kinds of sanctions for players who
exerted high eﬀort in the ﬁrst round. For these players, the exogenous sanction has a substantial
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an endogenous sanctions is not distinguishable from not introducing a sanction at all. As the
signaling explanation predicts, the way in which the sanction was introduced did not matter for
those who played low eﬀort in the ﬁrst round.
To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper that looks empirically at the eﬀects of sanctions
on beliefs in a minimum eﬀort game. Moreover, it is the ﬁrst paper that empirically studies
the signaling eﬀect that the introduction of sanctions may have. Its main message is that the
eﬀectiveness of sanctions depends on the context in which they are introduced. On the one hand,
people recognize the incentive eﬀects that sanctions will have on others, which multiplies their
eﬀectiveness. On the other hand, when information about the behavior of others is limited, as
is the case in modern large-scale societies, the introduction of sanctions may cause pessimism
by drawing attention to past misbehaviors. This is especially true for those that are optimistic
and behave cooperatively. This ﬁnding implies a diﬃcult balancing act that a government or
principal must perform: It must try too keep the optimist optimistic, while at the same time
encouraging the pessimists to change their behavior. The results of this experiment suggest
that ‘mild law’ may not be the optimal way to do so, because it induces pessimism with little
compensation in the way of material incentives.
A further contribution of this paper is the use of novel statistic tests. We use a new test
developed by Schlag (2008) based on a so-called stochastic inequality (Cliﬀ, 1993). This is an
exact test designed to assess the direction of a treatment eﬀect, without making (parametric)
assumptions about the distribution of the samples.1 Instead of comparing means in the un-
derlying distribution one compares a random observation from each distribution. Note that
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test can only reject the hypothesis that two samples are
drawn from identical distributions. Thus, it can identify the existence of a treatment eﬀect, but
is not informative about why the two distributions diﬀer signiﬁcantly. For instance, without
additional assumptions, one cannot draw conclusions about whether and how the means of the
samples diﬀer. Although the results of WMW test are completely in line with our results, its dif-
ferent null hypothesis would have only allowed us to conclude that sanctions inﬂuenced behavior,
we would not be able to draw conclusions how about how sanctions inﬂuenced behavior.
1An exact test is a test where the statement about its level can be proven, in contrast to a level that is derived
from an asymptotic approximation as the sample size tends to inﬁnity.
42 Literature
Our experimental analysis of the eﬀects of sanctions is related to several strands of literature.
In this section we brieﬂy summarize the links between our research and other contributions.
Our experiment relates to the literature on the crowding eﬀects of sanctions. This term refers
to the tendency of material or monetary incentives to diminish the internal motivation to engage
in the desired behavior. In extreme circumstances this can lead to less of the desired behavior.
This phenomenon has been empirically documented in many economic settings (see Frey and
Jegen (2001) and Bowles (2008) for surveys). For our purposes, the most interesting cases
involve sanctions to members of a group or a society. In a well-known experiment, Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000) show that introducing a ﬁne for picking up children late from a day-care centre
resulted in an increased number of people who picked up their children late. This eﬀect endured
even after the sanctions had been withdrawn. Ostmann (1998) provides experimental results
showing that external enforcement ﬁnanced by experiment participants only reduces harvests
in common pool problem by a small amount relative to a no-enforcement treatment. Frey
and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) conducted a survey on willingness to have nuclear waste repository
built in their community. Without compensation, 50.8% of the respondents answered positively,
but when the request was accompanied by an oﬀer of (substantial) monetary compensation,
the acceptance rate dropped to 24.6%. Sheﬀrin and Triest (1992) provide evidence that tax-
compliance is determined by a complex combination of attitudes and dispositions. They show
that the perception that others avoid their taxes is a major determinant of the decision to
evade. They also ﬁnd that well publicized crackdowns on evading taxpayers may erode the trust
of citizens in the other taxpayer’s compliance.
Most existing explanations for the crowding eﬀect focus on a notion of ‘intrinsic motivation’,
which can be diminished by sanctions under certain circumstances (Frey and Jegen, 2001).
Kahan (2005) suggests another explanation based on the idea that the situations in which
crowding out occurs can be viewed as coordination games. Although on the face of them,
settings like the ones mentioned above seem to resemble dilemma games, there is much evidence
that coordination plays a large role in the outcome. This is due to the existence of so-called
conditional cooperators or reciprocal agents (Fehr and G¨ achter, 2000). In determining their
behavior in social dilemmas, conditional cooperators condition their behavior on their beliefs of
what others do. G¨ achter (2006) surveys the evidence on the existence of conditional cooperation.
Insofar as people are conditionally cooperative, their belief that others will cooperate will turn
out to be a crucial variable in determining the outcome of collective action problems. Kahan
argues that sanctions may provide conditional cooperators with a signal that others do not
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There is a small theoretical literature that models this explanation of the crowding out eﬀect.
Sliwka (2007) provides a principal-agent model in which high incentives set by a principal can
provide conformists in a organization with a cue that others are shirking, which may cause them
to shirk themselves. Similarly, Van der Weele (2007) models a public good game where high
sanctions by the government signal to conditional cooperators that defection is the social norm,
which leads the government to apply lower sanctions in equilibrium.
Our research is also related to a well established strand of literature in legal scholarship: the
focal point theory of expressive law (McAdams 2000). This view holds that laws express values
and attitudes, that can shape individual behavior. Cooter (1998) argues that the expressive
character of sanctions can be used to coordinate expectations on a beneﬁcial equilibrium. People
expect others to follow the law, and so a self-fulﬁlling equilibrium can be induced by a sanction
that penalizes behavior pertaining to other equilibria. The core idea is that for this to happen,
laws do not necessarily have to be fully deterrent (i.e. they can be mild), because their role
is merely to create focal points. Bohnet and Cooter (2001) and McAdams and Nadler (2003)
provide evidence that mild sanctions can lead to better coordination in coordination games
with two equilibria. These result is in line with results about experimental coordination games
showing that in coordination environments, even advisory cheap talk by an external party or
coordinator can help to bring about coordination on eﬃcient equilibria (Chaudhuri and Bangun
2007, Van Huyck et al. 1992).
Finally, we relate to the experimental literature on coordination games. The speciﬁc game
that we use was introduced by Goeree and Holt (2001, 2005) who also foreshadow our answer
to question 1. Unlike the present paper, they do not introduce sanctions between rounds, but
investigate the behavior of diﬀerent subject populations under high and low costs of eﬀort.
They show that over multiple periods, convergence to more eﬃcient equilibria gradually takes
place. Devetag and Ortmann (2007) provide a comprehensive survey of experimental results in
coordination games.
In a recent paper, Brandts and Cooper (2008) compare the eﬀectiveness of cheap talk and
monetary incentives in an experimental design close to ours. Groups consist of ﬁve: four agents
play a minimum eﬀort game, and a manager proﬁts from the degree of coordination that they
reach. The manager can use ﬁnancial incentives or communication messages to try to increase
the level of cooperation. The authors ﬁnd that communication is more eﬀective in increasing
coordination than are incentives. However, in contrast to our setup, incentives in this game
cannot give any signals since the minimum eﬀort of the previous round is known to each player.
6In the paper that is perhaps closest to ours, Tyran and Feld (2006) explicitly compare the
eﬀects of endogenously and exogenously introduced mild law. In their experiment, subjects allo-
cated to groups of three can ﬁrst vote on whether sanctions for defectors should be introduced.
They then play a public good game with or without the sanctions. The authors ﬁnd that mild
sanctions are eﬀective when they result from the voting procedure, but not when imposed exoge-
nously (by the experimenters). The authors show that voting for mild law raises expectations
that others cooperate, and this in turn raises cooperation.
3 Discussion of the Experimental Setup
The study of sanctions comes up in settings that can often be described as either a coordination
game or a Prisoners’ dilemma. We chose a coordination game as an object of study, because
in such games the rational choice depends only on the beliefs about the actions of the other
player(s) in the game. This allows us to isolate the sanctions’ eﬀects on behavior that derive
from the change in a subject’s belief, and we can disregard issues to do with social preferences
and/or dominant strategies that usually play a role in Prisoners’ dilemmas.
3.1 The Experimental Game
We use as a workhorse the minimum eﬀort game by Goeree and Holt (2001 , 2005), because it
has large action spaces that allow players to express rather precisely their preferences and beliefs.
The structure of the game is as follows: two players simultaneously choose an eﬀort level between
110 and 170 (the bounds are chosen such that there are no clear focal points). Subjects’ payoﬀs
are determined by the minimum of these two eﬀorts, minus the cost of their own eﬀort times a
parameter k ∈ [0,1], which is the same for both players. In each period we also elicit from each
player an interval in which he believes the other will play his eﬀort (see below). In contrast to
the original setting by Goeree and Holt (2001) in which the game is played only once, in our
experiment the game is played twice. Moreover, in some treatments (see below) a sanction F was
introduced in the second round, where F = 0.5 · (170 − ei). Thus, F implements a subtraction
to the payoﬀs that is proportional to the deviation of the chosen second round eﬀort from the
maximum eﬀort (170). Although this sanction decreases the riskiness of playing higher eﬀort,
the game remains a coordination game. The sanction is applied to both the players in the group,
although the actual subtraction may diﬀer between the players depending on their second round
eﬀort choice. Another diﬀerence with the game of Goeree and Holt (2001) is the presence of
a third player in the group. Depending on the treatment, this third player is either active or
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introduce a sanction for both players in the group. Player 3 receives a payoﬀ proportional to
the minimum eﬀort chosen by the other two players.
In sum, payoﬀs in round 1 are determined as follows:
πi (ei,e−i) = min{ei,e−i} − 0.85 · ei, for i = 1,2;
π3 (e1,e2) = 0.25 · min{e1,e2}.
where πi (e1,e2) is the payoﬀ of player i in tokens, ei ∈ [110,170] is the eﬀort level chosen either
by player 1 or player 2, and k is the cost of eﬀort. In the second round the sanction F may
be implemented by either player 3 or the experimenters. Payoﬀs in round 2 are given by the
following equations:
πi (ei,e−i) = min{ei,e−i} − 0.85 · ei − 0.5 · (170 − ei), for i = 1,2;
π3 (e1,e2,s) = 0.25 · min{e1,e2} − s · cs,
where cs is the cost of introducing a sanction for the third player and s ∈ {0,1} is the choice to
introduce a sanction (1) or not (0).
An important element of the experimental design is the information structure. The third
player is the only one to be informed of the eﬀort levels of players 1 and 2 when the ﬁrst round is
concluded. That is, at the beginning of the second round, players 1 and 2 do not know the eﬀort
levels of the other player, nor their own payoﬀs from the ﬁrst round. However, before making
any choices in the second round, players 1 and 2 know whether a sanction has been applied to
their group. Note that players did not know before the ﬁrst round that there would be a second
round. They were informed of this only after the ﬁrst round had concluded.
3.1.1 Parameters, Treatments, and Procedures
We chose to set the cost of eﬀort at 0.85, i.e. close to 1. The evidence reported in Goeree and
Holt (2001) indicates that in the presence of high costs of eﬀort, individuals tend to coordinate
on lower eﬀort levels. We wanted eﬀort choices to be not too high in order to give player 3 an
incentive to introduce a sanction in the treatments in which she is active. We set cs = 4, a level
calibrated to induce roughly half of the players 3 to introduce a sanction.
We now describe the treatments. In all treatments, the ﬁrst round is the same: players 1 and
2 play the minimum eﬀort game and player 3 is inactive. In the baseline treatment there is no
sanction in the second round, and player 3 is inactive. That is, the second round is conducted
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the exogenous no-sanction (ExNS) treatment. By exogenous we mean that the choice to (not)
introduce a sanction was not conditional in any way on previous decisions by the subjects. This
was clear because the choice was made by the experimenters in a centralized fashion for all
groups in the session. In the second treatment, sanction F is implemented in the second round.
The sanction was communicated to the players before they reported their eﬀort level and their
beliefs about others’ actions. They then played the second round with the sanction in place. In
spirit of the experimental economic literature, we refer to the sanction in neutral terms, i.e. as a
“subtraction”. In the remainder, we refer to this treatment as the exogenous sanction treatment
(ExS).
Although player 3 is present in all treatments, she is only active in the third treatment. After
player 3 has observed the chosen eﬀort levels of players 1 and 2 in the ﬁrst round, she is asked
to decide whether to a) change both player 1’s and 2’s payoﬀ structure in the second round by
introducing a sanction F, or b) leave the payoﬀ structure unaltered with respect to the ﬁrst
round. After player 3 has taken her decision, players’ 1 and 2 are informed of it. They then play
the second round with payoﬀ structure decided by the principal. We refer to this treatment as
either the endogenous sanction treatment or EnS (if a sanction is introduced by player 3) or the
endogenous no-sanction treatment or EnNS (if no sanction was introduced).
Because the experiment features just two rounds of play and no possibility of learning, it
was very important that people understood the game correctly from the start. To this purpose
we ran a tutorial before the start of the ﬁrst round. In the tutorial, participants had 5 minutes
to come up with hypothetical eﬀort choices of players 1 and 2 and to calculate their payoﬀs
resulting from these choices. The tutorial took place before assigning subjects to a role, so that
also players 3 could practice with the calculation of payoﬀs of players 1 and 2. In addition to
this tutorial, the input screens in the actual experiment provided subjects with the possibility
calculate their payoﬀs from a given choice. That is, after entering and before conﬁrming their
choices, subjects could enter a hypothetical choice of the other player and let the computer
calculate their payoﬀs resulting from these choices.
The experiment was conducted in several sessions at the economics lab of the university of
Siena, Italy. The ﬁrst sessions took place in May and June 2007. Another series of sessions was
conducted in November 2007. Subjects entered their eﬀort and belief choices on a computer
that was running on the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The number of subjects in an
experimental session varied between 18 and 30. The subjects earnings were in tokens as speciﬁed
above, which were converted into euro’s at the end of the experiment at an exchange rate of 10
tokens = 0.75 euro. The instructions were read out loud to make them public knowledge. The
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3.1.2 Elicitation of a Belief Interval
Apart from the eﬀort choices, we are interested in the eﬀect of sanctions on players’ anticipation
of what the other will do. Therefore, in the same input screen in which players 1 and 2 enter
their eﬀort choice, we asked them to enter beliefs about the other player’s eﬀort choice in that
round. Rather than elicit a point belief, we decided to elicit an interval. More precisely, players
have to specify a range (i.e. a lower bound L and its upper bound U) in which the other player’s
choice is believed to fall. In order to increase accuracy in belief reporting we reward a correct
guess2. The earnings from a guess are determined as follows:
πi(L,U) =
(
0 if e−i / ∈ [L,U]
0,15 · (60 − (U − L)) if e−i ∈ [L,U]
That is, a wrong guess (the actual number chosen by the other player falls outside the
speciﬁed range) yields no payoﬀ. A correct guess (the actual number chosen by the other
player lies within the speciﬁed range) yields 15% of diﬀerence between the length of the interval
[110,170] and the width of the interval [L,U]. Thus, the smaller the speciﬁed range, the higher
the earnings if the guess is correct. However, a smaller range also increases the risk that the
guess is not correct, in which case no tokens are earned.
Eliciting an interval has the advantage that it gives information not only about the location
of the belief distribution, but also about its dispersion. Schlag and Van der Weele (2009) show
that provided this is single peaked, this interval scoring rule will induce rational decision makers
to include both the median and the mode of their belief distribution in the chosen interval.
Moreover, the width of the interval is determines an upper bound on the variance of the belief
distribution. This makes the width of the interval a proxy for how ‘sure’ the decision maker is.
These results hold for any risk neutral or risk average decision maker. Note that the alternative
quadratic scoring rule is only guaranteed to reveal the mean when the decision maker is risk
neutral.
4 Non-Parametric Tests of Stochastic Inequality
One contribution of this paper is the use of new non-parametric tests that have been designed
for small samples (Schlag, 2008). The disadvantage of existing tests is that they either add
2G¨ achter and Renner (2006) show that incentivizing beliefs’ reporting has a positive impact on beliefs accuracy.
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the alternative hypothesis is no longer the complement of the null hypothesis) or that they can
only establish that a treatment changes the distribution of outcomes, not how. Speciﬁcally, the
standard non-parametric test in the experimental literature for comparing samples has been the
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test. The null hypothesis of this test is that the two samples
are drawn from the same population. Thus, unless one is willing to make further assumptions on
the underlying distributions (i.e. that all other moments of the probability distributions except
the mean are equal), the WMW test cannot identify the direction of the treatment eﬀects. It
can only establish that they are diﬀerent.
We analyze the eﬀect of sanctions by testing ‘stochastic inequality’. In order to identify
the direction of a treatment eﬀect we compare the likelihood that one variable realizes a higher
outcome than the other. We measure this degree by the so-called stochastic diﬀerence which
ranges from −1 to 1. Speciﬁcally, given two random variables Y1 and Y2, δ = Pr(Y2 > Y1) −
Pr(Y2 < Y1) is called the stochastic diﬀerence of Y1 versus Y2. δ is estimated by taking the sample
average across all pairings of the data. One says that Y2 tends to realize higher outcomes than
Y1 if δ(Y1,Y2) > 0. To establish a treatment eﬀect in this direction, we test the null hypothesis
that δ ≤ 0. When Pr(Y1 = Y2) = 0 then this is equivalent to testing that Pr(Y2 > Y1) ≤ 1/2.
When the data is given as matched pairs then the appropriate test is a sign test. When data is
given by two independent samples, we implement the test of Schlag (2008). Appendix A gives
a more extensive formal treatment of these procedures.
It is worth noting that there are no other exact nonparametric tests for comparing means
or testing stochastic inequality given independent samples. In particular, the WMW test is
not an exact test for comparing the underlying means given two independent samples (e.g.
see simulations of Forsythe et al., 1994). Neither are there other exact nonparametric tests
for correlation; the Spearman rank correlation test can only identify non-identical distributions.
Non-exact tests of stochastic inequality have appeared in the biostatistical applications (Brunner
and Munzel, 2000). One innovation of the tests we use here is that they are exact, in the sense
of having the level that they are claimed to have, and do not rely on asymptotic approximations.
They are the ﬁrst exact tests for this stochastic inequality based on independent samples. Unlike
tests for means, the ordinal nature of tests of stochastic inequality makes them less sensitive
to outliers and hence they are very well suited to uncover signiﬁcant diﬀerences given small
samples.
We want to emphasize that the results of the more traditional Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test support our analyses. All signiﬁcant results that we present are also signiﬁcant, often
more so, in the corresponding WMW test (these results are available on request). However, as
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allow us to draw conclusions about the direction of the eﬀect. Because the WMW test is rather
powerful, we will use it when we want to gather support for a claim that two samples have
similar distributions. In this case we are not primarily interested in the direction of the eﬀect.
Rather, we want to have the strongest possible test to falsify the claim that two samples are
similar.
5 Hypotheses and Results
In this section we present the results of our experiment. We present our analysis by testing
conjectures that are based on the research questions mentioned in the introduction. These
conjectures are speciﬁc enough to provide us with the null hypotheses necessary for classical
statistical analysis.
5.1 Statistics for the Entire Sample
The number of participants in the experiment was 243: 45 in treatment 1, 51 in treatment 2,
and 147 in treatment 3. In treatment 3, the principal decided to introduce a sanction in 29
out of 49 groups. Each experimental session lasted roughly 35 minutes and the subjects earned
7.5 euros on average3. In the tutorial 82% (199 out of 243) correctly computed the payoﬀs
from hypothetical choices. As another indication of whether people understood the game, we
also checked whether there were ‘anomalous observations’: people who speciﬁed an eﬀort choice
above the upper bound of their belief interval. We found just 6 such observations.
We observe a high correlation between beliefs and eﬀort in the ﬁrst round of each treatment,
as you would expect in a minimum eﬀort game. The correlation coeﬃcient between the lower
bound of beliefs and the eﬀort choice is 0.85∗∗∗, which is highly signiﬁcant4. The correlation
with the upper bound was somewhat lower (0.81∗∗∗), because many subjects speciﬁed an upper
bound at, or close to 170 in the ﬁrst round. They were thus restricted in moving this upper
bound in the second round. For most subjects this was not true for the lower bound of the
belief interval. For this reason we take the lower bound of the interval as our indicator of beliefs
throughout this paper.
Figure 1 shows a histogram of ﬁrst period eﬀort choices, aggregated over all treatments. We
3If this seems little, remember that the incentives were concentrated on only two (eﬀort) choices. At each of
these choices there was thus relatively a lot at stake.



















Lower Bound Median Upper Bound
100 120 140 160 180
Effort in Round 1
First Round Effort
Figure 1: Histogram of ﬁrst round eﬀort choices of all subjects.
see a large clustering of observations around 170, a smaller cluster around 110 and an otherwise
fairly uniform distribution5. We want to analyze the eﬀect of the introduction of a sanction in the
second round, and hence in the remainder we focus on the changes of eﬀort and beliefs between
rounds. We compute for each subject the change in beliefs and eﬀort levels, and compare these
changes across treatments.
There are a few complications to analyzing changes between rounds. First of all, the obser-
vations for the group members in the third treatment are not independent. The eﬀort decision
of one subject in the ﬁrst round will inﬂuence the decision to implement a sanction by the third
player. This in turn may inﬂuence the eﬀort and beliefs of the other subject in the second
round. When we do statistical testing, we correct for this dependence by taking the average
of two observations whenever the subjects come from the same group, and treating it as one
observation.
Second, interpreting changes in eﬀorts and belief intervals as reaction to the experimental
setting is not straightforward. Subjects that speciﬁed an eﬀort level or a lower bound on beliefs
of (or close to) 170 in the ﬁrst round are unable to adjust this level upwards, and subjects who
chose close to 110 cannot adjust it further downwards. This will generate observations of zero
5The eﬀort levels are higher than those in Goeree and Holt (2001) with a cost of eﬀort of 0.9. Reasons may be
that the cost of eﬀort is slightly lower in our setup and that in the instructions we did not use the word “cost”
when referring to k.
13changes that may not reﬂect the actual preferences or adjustment of beliefs of the participants.
As we will see, the general trend in the experiment was for subjects to adjust their beliefs
and eﬀorts upwards in the second round. Thus, the problem is not severe for those who are
initially on the lower bound. Speciﬁcally, there were no subjects who chose low eﬀort (below
135 but above 110) and subsequently moved their eﬀort downwards, and only three who chose a
(small) downward adjustment of beliefs. Therefore we do not consider those who chose 110 to be
severely constrained. However, the matter is diﬀerent for those who chose eﬀort or belief levels
on (or close to) the upper bound of 170. It is likely that most of those subjects would have liked
to change their behavior if they had been able to move upward further, but were constrained to
do so. We believe that the fact that these people do not change their behavior does not give us
accurate information about their actual change in beliefs and their preferences over eﬀort levels.
Therefore, we restrict ourselves to analyzing the choices of those subjects who actually had a
choice. We focus on comparing the behavior across treatments of subjects who reported beliefs
or eﬀort lower than or equal to 165. In practice this means that for the analysis of the beliefs, we
excluded subjects who chose ﬁrst round belief levels strictly higher than an upper bound of 165.
This resulted in excluding 11 observations. For the analysis of the eﬀorts, we excluded subjects
who chose ﬁrst round eﬀort levels strictly higher than 165. This resulted in the exclusion of 39
observations. The median ﬁrst round eﬀort of the sample thus obtained is 135. The values of
the upper and lower bound that we applied are indicated in 1. In the remainder, we deﬁne high
eﬀort players as those who play ﬁrst round eﬀort in e ∈ {135,...,165} (i.e. above the median),
and low eﬀort players as those who play ﬁrst round eﬀort in e ∈ {110,...,134} (i.e. below the
median).
5.2 Eﬀort and Beliefs in the Baseline Treatment (ExNS)
While our analysis will focus on comparing behavior across treatments it is of interest to consider
what happens in the baseline case, where there are no exogenous sanctions. Recall that there
is no feedback between rounds in the treatment without sanctions. One might conjecture that
in the absence of feedback there is no change in eﬀort and yet it is not clear whether behavior
should not change over time simply due to the fact that a choice is made a second time. We
present the evidence in Table 1. We denote by Mean ExNS1 the mean of ﬁrst round variables
in the exogenous no-sanction treatment, and by ExNS2 the second round variables. The last
column presents the estimated stochastic diﬀerence of the ﬁrst round versus the second round in
treatment ExNS (remember from section 4 that this is the estimate of δ = Pr(Y2 > Y1)−Pr(Y2 <
Y1)). It is worthwhile to note that testing for stochastic inequality for matched pairs is equivalent
14n Mean ExNS1 Mean ExNS2
Stochastic Diﬀerence
ExNS1 vs ExNS2
Eﬀort 23 133 137 0.17
Belief 29 134 138 0.15∗∗
Table 1: Mean eﬀorts, mean beliefs, and stochastic diﬀerence between round 1 (ExNS1) and 2 (ExNS2)
in the exogenous no-sanction treatment (ExNS). ∗ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance
at 5%, ∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 1%.
to performing a sign test. We ﬁnd insigniﬁcant diﬀerences in the eﬀort (conﬁrmed by the
Wilcoxon rank sum test). On the other hand we ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that the lower belief
level tends to be higher in the second round. Apparently people move up their belief levels, but
as we can see from Table 1, changes are small so people are not suﬃciently optimistic to change
their eﬀort levels by much.
5.3 The Eﬀect of Exogenous Sanctions (Question 1)
Our ﬁrst question relates to the eﬀects of exogenous sanctions on eﬀorts. In the case of ex-
ogenous sanctions we can abstract from any signaling considerations because the sanction is
unconditionally imposed by the experimenters. Sanctions are modeled in our experiment by an
additional cost of making eﬀorts below the maximum 170. Mathematically this translates into
a reduced cost of eﬀort. Under a given belief distribution such a change in the cost of eﬀort
causes a rational agent to increase eﬀort.
If the subject anticipates that the other player also increases eﬀort, her beliefs about opponent
eﬀort become more optimistic, which makes it rational to increase eﬀort even more. Thus, we
expect that introducing sanctions causes an increase in beliefs but an even stronger increase in
eﬀort. If we compare behavior in round one and round two in the sanction treatment, we cannot
separate this anticipated eﬀect of sanctions from other eﬀects that we observed in the case of no
sanctions. The appropriate benchmark for comparison is the treatment without sanctions. We
formulate the following conjecture about this comparison:
Conjecture 1 The change in eﬀort and belief levels between rounds 1 and 2 is larger when there
are exogenous sanctions than when there are no exogenous sanctions in period 2. This eﬀect is
more pronounced for eﬀorts than it is for belief levels.
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Figure 2: The change in beliefs and sanctions for the whole sample, except those who chose ﬁrst
round eﬀorts ∈ {166,167,...,170} or ﬁrst round beliefs ∈ {166,167,...,170}. (Number of independent
observations for each sample at the top of the bar).
that a lower cost of eﬀort increases eﬀort levels in a between-subject design. Since our sanction
eﬀectively lowers the cost of eﬀort, it is reasonable to conjecture that (exogenous) sanctions will
increase beliefs and eﬀort. We now gather evidence for our conjecture. Figure 2 presents the
change in the means between round 1 and round 2 for the ExS and ExNS treatments. In Table
2 we report the results of our statistical analysis of conjecture 1. We estimate the stochastic
diﬀerence of the change in eﬀort under exogenous sanctions (ExS) versus the change in eﬀort
under exogenous no-sanction (ExNS). To indicate changes between the two rounds of a treatment
X we use the notation dX. Similarly we consider the changes in the lower bound of the belief
intervals, comparing the change under exogenous sanctions, and the change under no exogenous
sanction. Comparing the signiﬁcance levels we indeed observe a more pronounced diﬀerence in
terms of eﬀort than in terms of beliefs, as is also apparent from Figure 2. To formally test this
ﬁnding would involve designing a new test which is outside the scope of this paper. However
we do note that the 20% equi-tailed conﬁdence intervals overlap; by this crude method at least
this diﬀerence is not found to be signiﬁcant.
Summary 1 We conﬁrm our conjecture that changes in eﬀorts and beliefs tend to be higher





Table 2: Values of stochastic diﬀerence between changes in the exogenous no-sanction (ExNS) treatment
and changes in the exogenous sanction (ExS) treatment. ∗ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, ∗∗ denotes
signiﬁcance at 5%, ∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 1%.
tions in the second round. The data lend support to the claim this eﬀect is stronger for eﬀort
than for beliefs.
5.4 The signaling Eﬀect of Sanctions (Question 2)
We now investigate the eﬀects of endogenous sanctions. We compare subjects’ choices under
exogenous sanctions to subjects’ choices under endogenous sanctions. Note however that there
are at least two diﬀerences between these two groups. One diﬀerence is that in the exogenous
case the sanction was imposed by the experimenter while in the other case it was imposed by a
subject in the experiment. A second diﬀerence arises from the fact that the choice of a sanction
by the subject need not be unconditional (like the experimenter’s sanction) or random. The
choice of a sanction may reﬂect the observations of particular ﬁrst round eﬀort choices. It is
exactly this kind of information transmission we wish to analyze, and the experiment is designed
to isolate the signaling eﬀect from the incentive eﬀects of sanctions, by comparing ExS and EnS.
Before we analyze the reactions of the subjects to the imposition of an endogenous sanction, we
investigate the choice of sanction by the third player.
5.4.1 The Choice of Endogenous Sanctions
To see why player 3 would decide to implement a sanction, consider her monetary incentives.
The third player is rewarded proportionally to the minimum group eﬀort. However, imposing
sanctions carries a small cost. A maximizing principal will implement a sanction if she expects to
recoup these costs through an increased minimum eﬀort level. When initial eﬀort is low, there
is a large potential range for eﬀort increases, and changing behaviors can be very proﬁtable.
Moreover, if eﬀort is low in the ﬁrst round, there is no clear reason to think that it will rise
without a sanction. Thus we can formulate the following conjecture:
17Conjecture 2 In the endogenous sanction treatment, the likelihood of sanctions being imposed
by the ‘principal’ is decreasing in the minimal eﬀort chosen in the ﬁrst round.
In order to test this conjecture we compare the minimum ﬁrst round eﬀort in the sanctioned
groups to the minimum ﬁrst round eﬀort of non-sanctioned groups. We use the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test because we are interested in any diﬀerence between the samples. However, we
cannot ﬁnd marginally signiﬁcant evidence that the distributions of minimal eﬀort are diﬀerent
in the groups where sanctions are imposed as compared to the group without sanctions imposed
(the p-value is 0.63). Of course the samples are small, so the test is not very powerful. However,
as Table 5.4.1 shows the descriptive data do not point at large diﬀerences either. Note that
Mean of Min.
Group Eﬀort
# Below 165 # Above 166
No Sanction 138 17 3
Sanction 135 28 1
Table 3: Descriptive data on ﬁrst round minimum eﬀort of sanctioned and non-sanctioned groups. The
columns show the mean, and the number of groups with minimum eﬀort below 165 and above 166.
sanctions were also introduced occasionally when minimum eﬀort was high. Note that this need
not contradict equilibrium behavior. To see this, assume that there are some subjects that
always choose low eﬀort (‘low’ types) while others choose high eﬀort as they believe that the
others that think like them also choose high eﬀort. There can be equilibria in which a sanction
is imposed only if minimum eﬀort is high, and therefore are a signal that the group consists
of high types. Observing no sanction be a signal that the other subject is of type low and
hence it would be best to choose low. Thus the principal will impose sanctions on high types
to preserve coordination. This behavior is optimal for all players, provided there are suﬃciently
few low types to make play of high eﬀort in the ﬁrst round an equilibrium. Obviously there
are other equilibria in which coordination on high eﬀort is not sanctioned. This multiplicity
may be a reason why there is no clear pattern when sanctions are imposed. For all practical
purposes however, we can just assume that the behavior is random. This leads us to the following
conclusion:
Summary 2 We have no signiﬁcant evidence that sanctioned groups had lower minimum eﬀort.
The descriptive statistics similarly indicate a lack of a clear pattern. Sanctions seem to be
randomly imposed in our data set.
18This result implies that there is no endogeneity problem that could have arisen if only low-
eﬀort players had been sanctioned. To the extent that people who play low eﬀort react diﬀerent to
sanctions than others, this would have made the comparison with exogenous sanction treatment
more diﬃcult. To this comparison we turn now.
5.4.2 The Eﬀect of Endogenous Sanctions
Although the apparently random imposition of sanctions means that there is no clear informa-
tional content of sanctions, subjects may still believe that sanctions were imposed systematically.
Speciﬁcally, subjects may follow the same reasoning that led us to formulate Conjecture 2. If
this is the case, sanctions may still inﬂuence beliefs about the other group member. A small
thought exercise teaches us that the inference that can be made depends on a subjects’ own
eﬀort in the ﬁrst round. Consider a subject who believes Conjecture 2 to be true. Assume
ﬁrst that this subject chose high eﬀort in the ﬁrst round. When she observes that the principal
imposes no sanction, the subject infers that the opponent chose a high eﬀort because otherwise
they would have been sanctioned. This may give her cause for optimism, and a reason to keep
choosing high eﬀort. On the other hand, if the high-eﬀort subject is sanctioned, she infers that
it is likely that the opponent made a low eﬀort. The high eﬀort player will face the following
questions: Will the opponent react to the sanction with a suﬃcient increase in eﬀort such that
I should increase my own eﬀort too? Or is the opponent simply someone with a tendency to
make low eﬀorts even under sanctions, in which case I should lower my own eﬀort? Compared
to the case of exogenous sanction, the observation of a sanction induces uncertainty that the
other subject chose low eﬀort and will do so again. Now assume that the subject played low
eﬀort in the ﬁrst round. A sanction no longer has any informational content as long as the
subject believes in Conjecture 2. Speciﬁcally, any sanction can always be interpreted as being
aimed at the subject himself. Thus, there is no reason to assume his beliefs about the opponent
will change, and we expect him to behave much like someone under exogenous sanctions would
behave.
Note that higher order expectations that the players may have about each other may com-
plicate this pattern. For example, the low-eﬀort player who observes a sanction may think that
if his opponent is a high-eﬀort player, she will now be discouraged. We content ourselves with
trying to identify ﬁrst-order patterns. We summarize these patterns in two conjectures (remem-
ber from Section 5.1 that by low ﬁrst round eﬀort we mean eﬀort ∈ {110,...,134}, and by high
eﬀort we mean eﬀort ∈ {135,...,165}).
Conjecture 3 a) For those that chose a low eﬀort in the ﬁrst round, the change in eﬀorts
19and beliefs under endogenous sanctions will be similar to the change under exogenous
sanctions.
b) For those that chose a high eﬀort in the ﬁrst round, the change in eﬀorts and beliefs will
be larger under exogenous sanctions than under endogenous sanctions (signaling eﬀect).
We ﬁrst consider Conjecture 3a). Figure 3 presents the mean changes in beliefs and eﬀort for
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Figure 3: Means of changes in beliefs and eﬀort across treatments, for those who played low eﬀort
(∈ {110,111,...,134}) in the ﬁrst round. (Number of independent observations for each sample at the
top of the bar).
exogenous and endogenous sanction treatments. We now try to falsify Conjecture 3a). We test
the null hypothesis that the distribution of change in eﬀort is identical in the endogenous and
exogenous sanction settings. Since we are interested in any diﬀerence between the distributions
we use the WMW test. The results in Table 4 show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
identical distributions in the exogenous and endogenous treatments, both for eﬀort and beliefs.
The problem is that the sample sizes are small, so we can only provide limited evidence of
similarity.6 Therefore, we will now show that we can make similar claims about the eﬀectiveness
of sanctions, regardless of the way they were introduced. We compare ﬁrst and second round
6Using statistical hypothesis testing we can show at most that the diﬀerences are not too large, since formally





Table 4: p-values of the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sumtest of the exogenous and endogenous treat-
ments for those who played low eﬀort (∈ {110,111,...,134}) in the ﬁrst round. ∗ Denotes signiﬁcance at
10%, ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 5%, ∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 1%.
eﬀorts and beliefs between the exogenous and the endogenous treatments, both for sanction and
no sanction. We report results in Table 5.
Stochastic Diﬀerence
ExS1 vs. ExS2 EnS1 vs. EnS2
Eﬀort 1∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗
Belief 0.5∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗
Table 5: Estimates of stochastic diﬀerence between round 1 and round 2 of treatments ExS and EnS, for
those who played low eﬀort (∈ {110,111,...,134}). ∗ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance
at 5%, ∗∗∗ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1%..
We ﬁnd very similar estimates of stochastic diﬀerence in both sanction treatments. We feel
conﬁdent therefore to draw the following conclusion:
Summary 3 For subjects that made low eﬀorts in the ﬁrst round we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant evidence
that endogenous and exogenous sanctions have diﬀerent eﬀects on either eﬀorts or beliefs.
We will now test conjecture 3b). In Figure 4 we report average changes in eﬀorts and beliefs
across treatments for subjects who played high eﬀorts (∈ [135,165]) in the ﬁrst round. Eyeballing
the ﬁgure, it seems like the exogenous sanctions are more eﬀective than the endogenous ones
for those who played high eﬀort. The results based on stochastic diﬀerences, reported in Table
6, conﬁrm this. We observe signiﬁcant evidence that exogenous sanctions are more eﬀective in
raising eﬀort than endogenous sanctions. There is marginal signiﬁcant evidence that beliefs tend
to change more under exogenous sanctions. One wonders whether endogenous sanctions have
any eﬀect at all. To ﬁnd out we test if there is a diﬀerence between the endogenous sanction
However, the larger the sample size, the more powerful the test, and the more conﬁdent we are that the eﬀect, if
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Mean Comparison by Treatment
Figure 4: Means of changes in beliefs and eﬀort across treatments, for those who played high
eﬀort (∈ {135,136,...,165}) in the ﬁrst round. (Number of independent observations for each





Table 6: Estimates of stochastic diﬀerence between the exogenous and endogenous sanction treatments
for those who played high eﬀort (∈ {135,136,...,165}) in the ﬁrst round. ∗ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10%,
∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 5%, ∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 1%.
22treatment and the baseline treatment (ExNS). In the ﬁrst column of Table 7 we report the







Table 7: Comparison of the baseline (ExNS) treatment and the sanction treatments for those who played
high eﬀort (∈ {135,136,...,165}) in the ﬁrst round. ∗ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance
at 5%, ∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 1%.
We ﬁnd that endogeneity dampens the increase in eﬀorts and beliefs. In fact, it dampens it
so much that the eﬀect of endogenous sanctions cannot be distinguished from not mentioning
and introducing sanctions at all. However, the sample sizes are small, so it is possible that we
would not be able to reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions, even if the actual diﬀerence
is quite large. To counter this criticism, the second column of Table 7 shows the comparison
with the baseline treatment with the exogenous sanction. It is clear that for similar sample sizes
we get very signiﬁcant results of the eﬀectiveness of exogenous sanction.
Summary 4 For subjects who played high eﬀort in the ﬁrst round, endogenous sanctions are less
eﬀective in raising eﬀorts and beliefs than exogenous sanctions. In fact, the eﬀect of endogenous
sanctions cannot be distinguished from the eﬀect of not introducing a sanction at all.
5.5 Belief Intervals
Before we move to the conclusions, we investigate the results pertaining to the width of the
belief interval U −L. One of the reasons we asked the participants to specify an interval rather
than a point belief was that we are interested in the impact of sanctions on uncertainty about
the behavior of the other player, for which the size of the interval U − L is a proxy (see Schlag
and van der Weele, 2009). Figure 5 shows the changes in the width of the belief interval for
those who chose the lower belief interval in {110,111,...,165} in the ﬁrst round). As Figure
5 shows, uncertainty did not change between rounds in both no-sanction treatments, while
uncertainty went down in both sanction treatments. We can conﬁrm this result with statistical
analysis. Table 8 presents the estimates of stochastic diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and the second
round interval width in all treatments. In both no sanctions cases a test of stochastic inequality
























Interval Width Mean Comparison by Treatment
Figure 5: Means of change in the width of the interval across treatments, for those who chose the
lower belief interval in the ﬁrst round in (∈ {110,111,...,165}) in the ﬁrst round (number of independent
observations for each sample at the top of the bar).
10% level. By contrast, we ﬁnd that there is signiﬁcant evidence that the interval decreases
under exogenous sanctions and marginally signiﬁcant evidence that the interval decreases under
endogenous sanctions. This reinforces our conclusion that sanctions facilitate coordination partly
by reducing uncertainty about the behavior of others.
If sanctions were to have a signaling eﬀect, we would expect for those subjects who chose
high eﬀort (∈ {135,136,...,165}) in the ﬁrst round, that the reduction in uncertainty is smaller
under endogenous sanctions than under exogenous sanctions. Testing the direction of the eﬀect
with stochastic inequality, we ﬁnd that the tendency of the decrease in uncertainty is in fact
signiﬁcant at 1% in the exogenous sanction treatment, while under endogenous sanctions it is no
Stochastic Diﬀerence
EnNS1 vs. EnNS2 ExNS1 vs. ExNS1 EnS2 vs. EnS2 ExS1 vs. ExS2
Interval Width 0.067 0.0 −0.31∗ −0.46∗∗
Table 8: Estimates of stochastic diﬀerence between the round 1 and round 2, for those who chose the
lower belief interval in the ﬁrst round in (∈ {110,111,...,165}) in the ﬁrst round. ∗ Denotes signiﬁcance
at 10%, ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 5%, ∗∗∗ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1%..
24longer signiﬁcant. Moreover, the estimates for stochastic inequality do not reveal a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between EnS and either ExNS or EnS. This indicates that endogenous sanctions
do not reduce uncertainty for those who played high eﬀort in the ﬁrst round relative to the
no-sanction treatments. It thus seems that sanctions reduce uncertainty in general, except for
endogenous sanction applied to those who played high eﬀort. This is congruent with our signaling
explanation. However, when we directly compare the change in the interval width between both
sanction treatments for those who played high eﬀort, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
diﬀerence.
Summary 5 Uncertainty about the choice of the other player, as measured by the width of the
belief interval, declines in the sanction treatments. There is no evidence of a change in the
no-sanction treatments. For those who played high eﬀort in the ﬁrst round, the reduction in
uncertainty only occurs under exogenous sanctions.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
The results of our experiment allow us to conclusively answer our two questions. Over the whole
sample, exogenous sanctions clearly have a positive eﬀect on eﬀort levels and beliefs about others’
eﬀort level. However, the way in which sanctions are introduced matters. This manifests itself
in the fact that for people who played relatively high eﬀort in the ﬁrst round, the diﬀerence
between the eﬀect of an endogenously and an exogenously introduced sanction is signiﬁcant. In
fact, the endogenously introduced sanctions cannot be distinguished from the treatment without
(exogenous) sanctions.
We think that the most plausible rationale for this result is the idea that underlies our
hypotheses. The endogenous introduction of sanctions gives subjects a signal that the other
group member did not ‘cooperate’, in the sense that she selected low eﬀort. This tends to
make people more pessimistic about the eﬀort played by their companion in the group and less
willing to move up in eﬀort themselves. For those who played high eﬀort initially this pessimism
is reﬂected in the fact that beliefs and eﬀort do not signiﬁcantly increase under endogenous
sanctions. We also found that uncertainty, as measured by the width of the belief interval, does
not go down under endogenous sanctions as it does under exogenous sanctions. A signaling eﬀect
also explains why the diﬀerence between the sanction treatments does not occur for people that
play low eﬀort in the ﬁrst round. For them this signaling eﬀect is less pronounced, because they
may think that the sanction was aimed at them rather than at the other player in the group.
Our results discredit a naive view of deterrence in which it is only the economic incentives that
25matter for behavior. The literature on crowding and intrinsic motivation had already established
that sanctions may have adverse eﬀects in some situations. We have identiﬁed another reason
why sanctions may be ineﬀective. The result supplies a motivation why ‘mild law’ may not work.
In contrast to Tyran and Feld (2006), we provide evidence that the endogenous introduction of
sanctions rather than the exogenous one may be the cause of problems. In Tyran and Feld, a
voting procedure for the introduction of a mild sanction gives people the opportunity to send a
public signal that they are willing to cooperate. This in turn leads to increased cooperation. In
our experiment, the introduction is under the discretion of a third player who has observed past
play of the game. This setup reﬂects more closely the arrangements of a society where people
make the laws through representatives, rather than directly. In this case a sanction sends exactly
the opposite signal: sanctions are apparently necessary to keep people from deviating from the
eﬃcient outcome. The results show not only that such an eﬀect can exist when the information
conditions are right, but also that it is potentially quite substantial. Our study thus suggests
that mild law may not be the best instrument in this case, because it does not compensate for
this signaling eﬀect by providing adequate incentives for eﬃcient behavior.
In our experiment we observed the fact that the signaling eﬀect was not present for low
eﬀort players, because the groups were so small that the sanction was likely to reﬂect their own
behavior. However, in real life, relevant communities consist of many more than two people. This
means that even people who play low eﬀort may interpret the sanction as a signal, because it is
unlikely that a sanction is introduced on the basis of the behavior of one person. Assuming some
external validity of the experiment, one can conclude that a sanctioning authority needs to attain
a careful balance between correcting the behavior of deviants or pessimists and maintaining the
optimistic beliefs of cooperators. The results of the paper have implications for both public
policies and manager-employees relationships in ﬁrms. As pointed out by Brandts and Cooper
(2006), coordination failure can cause corporations and other organizations to become trapped
in unsatisfactory situations both for managers and employee.
How to attain such a balance is an interesting further research question that goes beyond the
aim of this paper. One possibility is to try to avoid the issue altogether by implementing harsh
laws making undesired action very costly. Such a deterrent law would presumably override the
signaling eﬀect. However, such laws and their enforcement may be costly to implement in the
real world, since they require at least some probability of detection for undesired activity and
potentially costly sanctioning activities. Another possibility to investigate is whether appropri-
ate framing of the introduction of a law can mitigate the signaling eﬀect. In the tradition of
experimental economics, this paper has tried to use neutral framing, replacing “eﬀort” with “a
number”, and “sanction” with “subtraction”. In real life however, a policy maker could attempt
26to surround the introduction of sanctions by soothing or stimulating messages. For example, one
may say the actual number of people who deviate from the eﬃcient strategy is small, or express
the expectation that they will conform to the sanction. However, it is theoretically unclear
why such cheap talk would be eﬀective. The experiments by Brandts and Cooper (2008) and
Van Huyck et al. (1992) incorporate the possibility of a principal to send written messages and
suggestions to the agents. These studies could be combined with the asymmetric information
structure in this paper in order to study this issue.
Last but not least, we wish to push forward the use of exact tests that “let the data speak” and
do not add distributional assumptions. One approach in the experimental literature on crowding
out has been to use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to uncover diﬀerences in distributions,
and to complement this test by looking at the descriptive statistics to make statements about
the direction of the eﬀect. A more popular approach throughout the experimental literature
has been to implicitly use the WMW test as test for comparing means, without mentioning the
condition needed for its validity, namely that all moments of the distributions except the ﬁrst
have to be the same. A contribution of our paper is the use of new tests (that are exact but do
not impose additional distributional assumptions) that allow us to test directly for a negative
impact of sanctions. We think these tests are an important addition to the toolbox of economists
working with small data sets.
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29Appendix A: Stochastic Diﬀerence and Inequality
Given two random variables Y1 and Y2, δ (Y1,Y2) = Pr(Y2 > Y1) − Pr(Y2 < Y1) is called the
stochastic diﬀerence of Y1 verses Y2. The stochastic diﬀerence can be estimated by computing
the sample analogues. Consider ﬁrst the case of matched pairs where data is given by joint
observations of Y1 and Y2. The estimate is calculated by ignoring all pairs in which Y1 = Y2
and then taking the diﬀerence between the empirical frequency of pairs with Y2 > Y1 and of
pairs in which Y2 < Y1. Now consider the case in which there are two independent samples,
one associated to each variable. Here one can estimate δ by considering the frequency of
Y2 > Y1 among all possible pairs and subtracting from this the frequency in which Y2 < Y1
among all these pairs. The resulting estimates are unbiased.
If δ (Y1,Y2) > 0 then one says that Y2 tends to yield larger outcomes than Y1. We wish to
identify signiﬁcant evidence that Y2 tends to yield larger outcomes than Y1. So we wish to test
the null hypothesis H0 : δ (Y1,Y2) ≤ 0 against the alternative hypothesis H1 : δ (Y1,Y2) > 0 for
a given speciﬁed level α. This is called a test of stochastic inequality (Cliﬀ, 1993, Brunner and
Munzel, 2000).
Assume that data has the form of matched pairs as given by n independent observations of
(Y1,Y2). Then this test reduces to a sign test. One uses a binomial test to test whether the
probability that Y2 > Y1 conditional on Y2 6= Y1 is ≤ 1/2.
Now assume instead that data is given by two independent samples of Y1 and of Y2. Let ni be
the number of observations of Yi, i = 1,2. We present an exact test of these hypotheses due to
Schlag (2008).
Randomly match one observation of each sample to generate min{n1,n2} matched pairs. Then
determine a rejection probability based on the randomized version of the sign test with size
0.2·α. The combination of the matching and the probabilistic recommendation yields an exact
randomized test with size 0.2 · α. We proceed as follows to derive an exact nonrandomized test
that has level α. Reject the null hypothesis if the rejection probability of the above
randomized test is above 0.2. Note that the factor used to reduce the size of the randomized
test is equal to the threshold used to translate the randomized recommendation into a
deterministic recommendation.
Appendix B: Instructions
We report instructions for the endogenous sanction treatment.
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Instructions for the ﬁrst round
Introduction
Welcome! You are going to take part in an experimental study of decision making. Please
follow these instructions carefully. You will be paid according to your performance. At the end
of the experiment we will tell you how much you earned.
Once everyone is seated we will formally start the experiment by reading the instructions.
After this reading you will have the opportunity to ask us questions about the procedure.
However at no time may you communicate with any of the other participants of your session.
Please also refrain from talking to others about your experience until tomorrow in order not to
inﬂuence others taking part in our experiment. Please turn oﬀ your mobiles in case they are
still switched on. We hope you have fun.
Matching and assignment to a role
The computer will assign you by chance (i.e. at random) to a group consisting of three
participants. You will not know the identity of the other two in your group and they will not
know your identity. The computer will also assign a role to each in this group. Two of this
group (from now on: player 1 and player 2) will have to take a decision as described below, the
third (from now on: player 3) will be inactive but still will earn some money.
Decisions and Earnings
During the experiment any choice will lead to some earnings expressed in tokens. Total
earnings at the end of the experiment are determined by the sum of all earnings and will then
be converted into money at the exchange rate of
1 token = 7.5 Eurocents (or equivalently: 100 tokens=7,5 Euro)
It will not be possible to have negative earnings at the end.
Player 1 and Player 2
Players 1 and 2 will simultaneously each be asked to make two decisions: to choose a number
and to make a guess about which number the other player chooses. Both decisions have to be
entered into a decision screen that is described in more detail below. Neither player will observe
the decisions of the other player.
Choosing a Number
Both player 1 and player 2 have to choose a number. This number can be any number
between and including 110 and 170 (fractions or decimals not allowed).
31The earnings in tokens of either player 1 or player 2 from choosing a number are determined
as follows. A player receives the lower of the two numbers chosen by player 1 and player 2 minus
85% of their own number.
This has the following implications:
- Assume players 1 and 2 chose the same number. Then a player will receive his/her own
number (since both numbers are equal, this is also the lowest number) minus 85% of his/her
own number.
- Assume that players 1 and 2 chose diﬀerent numbers. Then, the player who chose the
lower number could have increased his earnings by choosing a slightly higher number. However,
the player who chose the higher number could have increased his earnings by choosing a slightly
lower number.
The following mathematical representation will not be read out loud.
Suppose (among players 1 and 2) that one of them chooses the number Y and the other
chooses the number Z.
If Y = Z then the player who chose Y receives Y − 0.85× Y.
If Y < Z then the player who chose Y receives Y − 0.85× Y.
If Y > Z then player who chose Y receives Z − 0.85× Y.
In addition, players 1 and 2 ﬁrst receive a ﬁxed amount of 35 tokens.
Guessing the other’s choice
In addition to specifying a number, both player 1 and player 2 are asked to make a guess
about the number chosen by the other player. The guess is made by specifying a range (given
by its lower bound L and its upper bound U) in which the other player’s choice is believed to
belong.
The earnings in tokens of either player 1 or player 2 from making this guess are determined
as follows. A wrong guess (the actual number chosen by the other player falls outside the
speciﬁed range) yields nothing. A correct guess (the actual number chosen by the other player
lies within the speciﬁed range) yields 15% of the diﬀerence between 60 and the width of the
range U-L. Therefore the smaller the speciﬁed range, the higher the earnings if the guess is
correct. However, a smaller range also increases the risk that the guess is not correct, in which
case no tokens are earned.
The following mathematical representation will not be read out loud:
If the number Z chosen by the other player lies in the range (it is greater than or equal to L
32and less than or equal to U) then the player who has chosen L and U gets 0.15×(60−(U −L))




Figure 6: Input screen in the ﬁrs round.
Player 3
Player 3 does not make any decision during the experiment and earns an amount of tokens
equal to 25% of the smaller of the two numbers chosen by players 1 and 2.
A more mathematical representation of this statement will not be read out loud:
Tokens earned by player three = 0.25× (smaller of the two numbers chosen by player 1 and
player 2)
Tutorial
Before the experiment starts, so before roles are assigned, all participants have the possibility
to practice and to get used to the structure of the game. To this end, you will participate in
a tutorial round, where you will see the decision screen as described above. You will have 5
minutes to enter as many diﬀerent values as you like for both your own number and your guess,
33and the other player’s hypothetical number. You can then use the check button to see what
your earnings from these numbers and your guess would be. You are encouraged to verify the
calculation behind the earnings of both the number choice and the guess. The values entered in
this tutorial have no inﬂuence on your earnings and will not be recorded. After 5 minutes the
tutorial will stop and the experiment will start.
Final Remarks
During the experiment, you are not permitted to speak or communicate with the other
participants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, please raise your hand
and one of the experimenters will come and answer it.
At this time, do you have any questions about the instructions or procedures? If you have a
question, please raise your hands and one of the experimenters will come to your seat to answer
it.
Instructions for the second round
Introduction
Now we run a second and ﬁnal experiment. Earnings will be added to your previous earnings.
After this new experiment everything is over and your total payment will be calculated.
This new experiment is very similar to the previous one up to some changes we highlight.
Matching and roles
All participants are matched with the same people as before and keep the roles they had
before.
Decisions and Earnings
IN CONTRAST to the previous experiment, player 3 now also makes a decision.
Player 3
At the start of the experiment, before player 1 and 2 make any decisions, player 3 observes
the numbers chosen by players 1 and 2 in the previous experiment. After having observed
these numbers, player 3 makes a decision that determines how earnings of players 1 and 2 are
calculated in this new experiment. The outcome of this decision is observed by players 1 and 2
before they make their choices. Player 3 has the following two choices:
a) NOT CHANGE: To choose “not change” means that the earnings of all players are as
in the previous experiment. In particular, player 3 earns 25% of the smaller of the two numbers
chosen by players 1 and 2.
34b) CHANGE: To choose “change” means that earnings in tokens of all players are
changed as follows. Players 1 and 2 receive the lower of the two numbers chosen minus 85% of
their own number minus 50% of the diﬀerence between 170 and the player’s own chosen num-
ber. . That is, relative to the previous experiment, there is an extra amount subtracted to your
earnings that is larger the smaller your number is. Player 3 earns 25% of the smaller of the
two numbers chosen by players 1 and 2 minus 4. The terms that are new as compared to the
previous experiment have been underlined.
Mathematical illustration not to be read out loud:
Suppose player 3 chooses “change” and (among players 1 and 2) that one of them chooses
the number Y and the other chooses the number Z.
If Y = Z then the player who chose Y receives Y − 0.85 × Y − 0.5 × (170 − Y ).
and player 3 receives 0.25 × Y − 4.
If Y < Z then the player who chose Y receives Y − 0.85 × Y − 0.5 × (170 − Y ).
and player 3 receives 0.25 × Y − 4.
If Y > Z then player who chose Y gets Z − 0.85 × Y − 0.5 × (170 − Y )
and player 3 receives 0.25 × Z − 4.
Regardless of the choice of player 3, player 1 and 2 also receive a ﬁxed amount of 35 tokens.
Player 1 and Player 2
As in the previous experiment, players 1 and 2 make two decisions: choose a number and
make a guess by specifying a range. Earnings from making the guess are as in the previous
experiment, earnings from choosing a number are speciﬁed above.
Input Screens here
Final Remarks
If you have any questions then please ask them now.
Please do not log oﬀ the computer when the experiment is over.
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